The School of Business and Management of UCLan Cyprus organises the seminar: ‘Information Asymmetry & Capital Attraction’, on Thursday the 27th of February, 2020, at 12:00 – 13:00.
In this seminar, Nick Demos will discuss the economic theory of the agency paradigm, which addresses the information asymmetry and communication gap between management and shareholders and other stakeholders. From an efficient market hypothesis (EMH) perspective, a market is efficient if information is included in the market price.
Top management or company information insiders use a variety of corporate communication tools as a filter of selective and biased information, an official company communication voice and as a buffer and protection zone for the executives. Information insiders use mandatory reporting but also recognize the vital role of the effects of discretionary public and private corporate communication tools such as presentations, analyst and press coverage, roadshows, private meetings, etc. and the timing of the corporate disclosure.
The seminar will highlight that voluntary disclosure research covers inadequately some of the identifiable strands of related issues such as disclosure, visibility, analyst and media following and investor following and ownership, and will offer important recommendations for future research.
For further information, please contact
Dr Konstantinos Kakoudakis: KKakoudakis@uclan.ac.uk
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